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It is a well-known fact that the drug-related violence in
Mexico has seen an upsurge in recent year. This increase in
violent crimes has been attributed to the so-called “war
against drug trafficking” which was declared when President
Felipe Calderón took office in 2006. From 2006 to 2010 there
have been around 30,000 drug-related deaths in Mexico –10% of
which are considered civilian casualties.1 As a result,
Mexicans have been fleeing away from areas where the conflict
between drug cartels or between drug lords and the Mexican
army has been more intense. International migration is
certainly an attractive option, especially for those living
closer to the border. This paper aims at documenting the
effect of drug-related violence on immigration to the United
States, as well as characterizing the new immigrants.
Previous literature has shown that violence caused by civil
conflicts forces people to migrate to safer locations. The
Colombian case is particularly interesting since it shares
many characteristics with the Mexican experience. Ibáñez and
Vélez (2008) have documented that the drug-related crime and
violence forced Colombians to migrate to safer locations
within Colombia. Wood et al. (2010) find evidence that crime
victimization in Latin America induces people to seriously
think about moving to the United States.
Therefore it is not surprising that Mexicans exposed to drugrelated violence are fleeing away from the conflict zones and
that they are finding in the United States a safe haven. This
phenomenon has been publicized in the American news media:
the U.S. cities in the southern border have seen a relative
increase of middle-class Mexican migration. These new
migrants have established new businesses in the United States
(Becker 2009; Campoy 2009; Sheridan 2011), and are therefore
different from the archetypical Mexican migrants.
To my knowledge there is no rigorous research documenting
this forced migration all across the US-Mexico border. This
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paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. The
objective of the paper is twofold. First, it will provide
evidence of the changes in demographics along the US-Mexican
border. Using data from Mexican administrative records of
death certificates and the American Community Survey (ACS)
from 2000 to 2010 I will document how the upsurge in
violence, as measured by homicide rates, led to an increase
of immigrants in the southern border states of the United
States. And second, will also document if there are changes
in the openings of business in the counties along the US
border using data from self-employment in the ACS and data
from the Country Business Patterns. The working hypothesis in
this case is that Mexican migrants transfer their businesses
to the United States or that they simply open businesses in
the US to make a living.
Data Description
In both the descriptive and econometric analysis we use data
from many different sources. Homicide rates are estimated as
the homicide cases per 100,000 people in the municipality.
Homicide cases come from death certificates and are identified by the cause of death. Population data comes from the
2000, 2005 and 2010 Mexican Census of Population conducted by
the National Statistical Institute (INEGI for its Spanish
acronym). The population of years in between surveys was
estimated using a constant population growth rate. Homicide
rates are weighted by the square root of the distance between
Mexican municipalities and U.S. counties. Geographical data
was obtained from both INEGI and the Census Bureau.
In order to characterize Mexican immigrants in the United
States, we use the 2000 Census of Population and the 2005 to
2010 American Community Surveys.2 Finally, the data on
businesses comes from the County Business Patterns series
compiled by the Census Bureau.3
Violence and Changes in Mexican Immigration
We will first document the rise in homicide rates in Mexico.
Figure 1 presents the trends in homicide rates since 2000.
Each of the panels in the figure compares homicide rates
according to how close they are to the border. Panel A
compares the municipalities in the northern-border states
(denoted with a 1) with those in non-border states (denoted
2
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by 0). It is easily verifiable that there has been a marked
increase in the homicide rates all over Mexico since 2008,
but particularly in the northern-border states: by 2010 the
mean homicide rates in the northern states was about 37
homicides per 100,000 people, whereas in the rest of the
country it was around 21 homicides per 100,000 people.
Figure 1.
Trends in homicide rates along the Mexico-US border
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Panel B, C and D in Figure 1 look more closely at the
homicide rates in municipalities near the border. The trend
observed in Panel A is mostly dominated by the violence
exerted in municipalities closer to the border. Panel B
compares municipalities in a radius of 150 miles from the
border, Panel C in a radius of 75 miles, and Panel D in a
radius of 25 miles. As we get closer to the border the
homicide rates show an increasing pattern since 2008. For
instance, Panel D shows that municipalities within 25 miles
from the border have a homicide rate of around 125 homicides
per 100,000 people, while the rest of the municipalities in
Mexico exhibit a homicide rate of less than 25. That is, the
mean homicide rate in “border municipalities” is more than 5
3
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times higher than the mean homicide rate in the rest of the
country in 2010. Moreover, the mean homicide rate in these
“border municipalities” has seen a tenfold increase since
2000.
Given these figures, it is not surprising that Mexicans are
fleeing away from the border area. According to Mexico’s
Census of Population figures, in 2000 only about 9.5 percent
of Mexicans migrating within the country came from border
states: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo
León and Tamaulipas. By 2010, almost 24 percent of Mexico’s
internal mobility was originated in the border states.
Unfortunately, the census does not allow us to identify
households that migrated to the United States. In order to
characterize
those
immigrants,
we
will
first
present
descriptive statistics of Mexican immigrants in the United
States using data from the 2000 US Census of Population, and
the 2005 and 2010 American Community Surveys.
Table 1. Characteristics of Mexican immigrants: Border
vs. non-border states
Non-border states

Border states

2000

2005

2010

2000

2005

2010

Age: 0 to 20

0.3742

0.2891

0.2613

0.4158

0.3552

0.3136

Age: 21 to 35

0.4946

0.5350

0.5476

0.4388

0.4766

0.4362

Age: 36 to 64

0.1035

0.1387

0.1535

0.1012

0.1264

0.1600

Female

0.3757

0.3870

0.4088

0.4468

0.4422

0.4734

Married

0.3836

0.4138

0.3534

0.3714

0.4093

0.3583

Self-employed

0.0272

0.0351

0.0499

0.0554

0.0786

0.0787

Salaried

0.9728

0.9649

0.9501

0.9446

0.9214

0.9213

Secondary

0.2457

0.3095

0.2992

0.1953

0.2277

0.2342

High School

0.0358

0.0412

0.0466

0.0337

0.0400

0.0638

College
0.0331 0.0357 0.0426 0.0268 0.0358 0.0589
Notes: Author's estimates using the 2000 U.S. Census of
Population, and the 2005 and 2010 American Community Surveys.
All quantities represent proportions of the characteristic
specified.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of recent Mexican
immigrants in the United States. Here recent immigrants are
defined as those who migrated less than 5 years prior to the
survey.
The first trend that stands out is that Mexican
migrants are older in 2000 than they were in 2010. Mexicans
in the southern border states (California, Arizona, New
Mexico and Texas) have a different age structure than those
in the rest of the U.S. We also find that a higher proportion
4
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of immigrants are females over time. Surprisingly, and
contrary to the anecdotal evidence telling that wealthy
families are the ones fleeing violence, over time less
migrants were married in 2010 than in 2005, and the border
exhibits only a slightly higher proportion of married
immigrants.
A recurring argument in the media is not only than wealthy
families are migrating, but that they are establishing
businesses or otherwise investing in the United States. In
this respect, we found that the proportion of self-employed
immigrants has increased since 2000, and it has always been
higher in the border states. However the proportion increased
by more in non-border states than in border states suggesting
that businessmen are in fact establishing their economic
activities away from the border and no in the border cities
as the media suggests.
Another way to find evidence of a wealthier-than-average
immigrant is to look at the educational structure. The last
three rows in Table 1 present the proportion of immigrants by
schooling level, where college denotes those who attended
college or more. The statistics present evidence that
immigrants are now better educated than in 2000, but also
that there was a large influx of college educated immigrants
in the border states. So at least in the border, we do find
some evidence of a changing face of Mexican immigrants.
When we take a closer look to the border,4 we find that the
population of Mexican migrants in those areas is getting
older, but more so the closer they live to the border. A
larger percentage of migrants are female as we move towards
the border. These figures are strikingly different to those
found in non-border states: the percentage of female migrants
in counties within 25 miles from the border is larger than 50
percent in 2010, whereas it is only around 40 percent in nonborder states that same year. The percentage of self-employed
increased more in those counties within 75 miles from the
border, but the increase is still lower than that observed in
non-border states. Finally, we find evidence that Mexican
immigrants living closer to the border are much better
educated suggesting that wealthier-than-average Mexicans did
migrate close to the border after 2005.
We also estimated the growth rates of businesses in border
and non-border states.5 Contrary to our previous findings on
4
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self-employment, the growth rate of business establishments
has indeed been larger in border-states than the rest of the
United States. The growth rate of businesses in the border
has been more than 50 percentage points higher, despite the
effects of the Global Recession of 2008.
In order to strengthen
following regression:

these

findings,

we

estimated

the

(1)
where
is the logarithm of the outcome of interest in
county j and year t;
is the logarithm of homicide
rate weighted by distance to Mexican municipalities within
150 miles from the border;
is an indicator variable of
counties in border states;
is the logarithm of the
unemployment rate;
are county fixed effects which control
for county characteristics are time-invariant; and
are
year fixed effects which control for the overall health of
the U.S. economy. The outcomes of interest will be the number
of Mexicans who migrated in the year prior to the survey, and
the number of business establishments. These outcomes will
also be restricted to either migrants’ characteristics or the
employment size of the establishment.
The working hypothesis in this paper is that immigrants
tended to flee to places relatively close to the border,
given that this type of migration is “facilitated” by Border
Crossing Cards. So we would expect the parameter
to the
positive. Table 2 presents the results of the estimation on
the number of Mexicans who migrated in the year prior to the
survey. The parameter on the interaction term is always
positive when it is statistically significant. In column one
for instance, we find that a 1 percent increase in the
homicide rate leads to around a 0.14 percent decrease in
migration, but to a 0.68 percent increase of Mexican
immigrants to the border. Analogously, we find that a 1
percent increase in homicide rates in Mexico leads to a 2
percent increase of college-educated Mexican immigrants, and
a 0.51 percent increase of secondary-educated Mexican
immigrants to the border. As expected, the unemployment rate
has a negative effect on migration.
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Table 2. Effect of violence on Mexican migration to U.S.
southern border states
Last year's Mexican immigrants
Dependent variable:

Homicide rate
Border dummy * Homicide
rate
Unemployment rate
Constant

Total

Selfemployed

Education level
High
College
School

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.1398

-1.0227

-1.8887

-0.1099

-0.4769**

[0.2062]

[1.2021]

[1.1921] [1.6735]

[0.1997]

0.7249***

0.6395

2.0315*

0.5162*

[0.2548]

[1.2138]

[1.2072] [1.6826]

[0.2859]

-0.7894***

0.0104

-0.2154

-0.4391**

[0.2516]

[0.1149]

[0.1362] [0.1293]

[0.1969]

1.0448

0.5999*

0.0519

0.5609

-0.0312

-0.1622

0.2906

Secondary

[0.6983]

[0.3255]

[0.3962] [0.3738]

[0.5531]

Observations

2,254

2,254

2,254

2,254

2,254

R-squared

0.636

0.447

0.527

0.485

0.561

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

County FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Notes:
Dependent
and
explanatory
variables
are
in
logarithms. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The effect found in the previous table could be the result of
spurious correlation between homicide rates and migration
inflows into the United States. In order to test for that, we
estimated equation (1) using the death rate from internal
causes instead of homicide rates (homicide is an external
cause of death) as a “fake experiment”.6 We find that the
effect disappears when we used this other explanatory
variable. We also estimated equation (1) using inflows of
Americans and non-Mexicans. As expected, we found that
homicide rates in Mexico do not have any effect on geographic
mobility of those two groups. We think these findings provide
evidence that the results presented in Table 2 are not a
consequence of spurious correlation.
Table 3 tests whether there is an effect of homicides in
Mexico on the number of business establishments in the United
States. Surprisingly and contrary to our findings in the
descriptive section, we find that violence did not spur a
boom of business openings in the border states, but all over
the United States. In any case, the interaction term is
negative which means that the average effect of homicides on
6
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business openings in border states is lower than the average
effect on the United States as a whole.
Table 3. Effect of Mexican violence on the
business establishments in southern U.S. border

number

of

Number of business establishments
Dependent variable

Total

Employment size
1 to 4

5 to 9

10 to 19

20 to 49

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.0223

0.0080

0.0545***

0.0513***

0.0296*

[0.0143]

[0.0122]

[0.0187]

[0.0148]

[0.0165]

Border dummy * Homicide
rate

-0.0117

0.0011

-0.0416**

-0.0386**

-0.0212

[0.0124]

[0.0191]

Unemployment rate

[0.0145]
0.0125***

-0.0033

-0.0091*

[0.0151]
0.0237***

[0.0178]
0.0347***

[0.0036]
10.0343**
*

[0.0047]

[0.0052]

[0.0059]

Constant

[0.0033]
10.6428**
*

9.0082***

8.5694***

8.1491***

[0.0090]

[0.0101]

[0.0128]

[0.0145]

[0.0165]

Observations

1,880

1,880

1,880

1,880

1,880

R-squared

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.999

0.998

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

County FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Homicide rate

Notes:
Dependent
and
explanatory
variables
are
in
logarithms. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The regression results confirmed some of our findings on the
descriptive analysis: the upsurge in violence in Mexico did
produce a spur of immigration to the states in the southern
U.S. border. However it also conduced to more business
openings in the United States with no greater effect in the
southern border states as suggested in both the media and the
descriptive analysis.
These results have very important implications for both
Mexico and the United States. First, we found collegeeducated people are fleeing away from violence in Mexico.
This type of immigration amounts to a loss of human capital
in Mexico, which is still relatively scarce as compared to
developed nations. Second, we found that homicide rates have
spurred a boom of businesses along the border, and all over
the United States. To Mexico, this result means that
investment is flying away from Mexico and into the United
8
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States. All in all, Mexico is losing both human and physical
capital due to the upsurge in violence generated by the war
on drugs. According to growth theories in economics, these
losses will eventually hamper economic growth in Mexico.
Mexico’s loss is however the United States’ gain.
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